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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model of strategic delegation in which share-
holders maintain an objective of market value maximization (MVM) of the
ﬁrm’s assets as measured by a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Optimal
delegation requires that managers maximize a linear combination of expected
proﬁts and ﬁrm values. The model allows for a much deeper consideration of
an investor’s view of risk that, up until now, has been widely ignored in the
delegation and industrial organization literature. In particular, we focus on
the CAPM’s distinction of nondiversiﬁable risk as opposed to the more general
concept of proﬁt or revenue variability. The results indicate that strategic dele-
gation of the MVM objective mitigates competition in both price and quantity
games relative to the standard proﬁt maximization objective. We further show
that the prisoner’s dilemma common in quantity delegation games is function-
ally impractical because shareholders would have to reward managers for lower
stock values. In addition, we demonstrate that the disparity of equilibrium
outcomes in quantity and price games is smaller with delegation than without
delegation. As products become more diﬀerentiated, the mentioned diﬀerence
becomes very small. The results suggest that mode of competition issues remain
important but are less pressing than commonly believed.
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Dating back to at least Berle and Means (1932), economists have wrestled with the
incentive compatibility issue between ﬁrm ownership and ﬁrm management. Marris
(1963) was the ﬁrst major eﬀort to reconcile key divergent goals of each party within
the context of a formal model. Under the condition of balanced growth of capital and
product demand, the model structure provides for a contemporaneous maximization
of managerial and ownership utility and suggests that strong and important link-
ages exist between capital and product markets. Early views on this subject were
correctly reserved to cases of imperfect competition (see Cyert and March (1963),
Marris (1963), Simon (1955), Baumol (1967), and Williamson (1963)). Despite the
notable progress in dealing with the so-called marginalist controversy, Kuehn (1969),
in summing up the state of the literature, indicated that nothing had emerged in
the way of a managerial objective function that could eﬀectively replace the proﬁt
maximization assumption.
Fershtman and Judd (1987), and Sklivas (1987) (hereafter FJS) extended and
greatly reﬁned the understanding of owner-manager relations. They demonstrated
that proﬁt-maximizing owners can precommit managers using a linear combination of
proﬁts and sales incentives to generate outcomes more (less) collusive in price (quan-
tity) setting duopolies.1 The strategic delegation literature has since branched out
signiﬁcantly to cover various topics of interest, for example: merger incentives (Ziss,
2001; Gonzalez-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat, 2001; Banal-Estanol and Ottaviani, 2006),
multiproduct ﬁrm incentives (Barcena-Ruiz and Espinosa, 1999; Moner-Colonques et
al., 2004), wage bargaining (Szymanski, 1994; Conlin and Furusawa, 2000), relative
performance measures (Fumas, 1992; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Miller and Paz-
1Similar strategic outcomes were developed by Eaton and Grossman (1986) in a trade context
and by Brander and Lewis (1986) in a model of capital structure.
2gal, 2001, 2005) and supergames (Spagnolo 1999, 2000, 2005). Much of the strate-
gic delegation literature has focused on the diﬀerential eﬀects of internal payment
schemes, leaving little in the way of guidance as to the proper speciﬁcation of the
owner’s objective function. Reitman (1993) inserts stock options in a FJS-type incen-
tive package, but values them only through ﬁrm proﬁts. Spagnolo (2000) considers an
owner’s objective to be shareholder value maximization. However, he assumes away
physical assets, leaving the market value of stock to be the perpetuity of ﬁrm proﬁts.
In the present paper, we take the straightforward stance that shareholders of
large corporations pursue an objective of capital market value maximization (MVM)
as determined through a certainty equivalent Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
framework. The model allows for a much deeper consideration of an investor’s view
of risk that, up until now, has been widely ignored in the delegation and industrial
organization literature. In particular, we focus on the CAPM’s distinction of nondi-
versiﬁable risk as opposed to the more general concept of proﬁt or revenue variability.
Our approach shows that the strategic delegation for MVM shareholders leads to a
consideration of expected proﬁts and revenue-weighted nondiversiﬁable risk in mak-
ing product market decisions. Such a delegation is possible with commonly observed
practices involving proﬁt bonuses and stock held in escrow.
The model ﬂeshes out several new developments of interest. As Fershtman and
Judd (1987) among others point out, the shareholders in a duopoly delegation setup
are essentially joint Stackelberg leaders and thus obtain the prisoner’s dilemma out-
come in the sense that they would be better oﬀ not engaging in quantity games involv-
ing the delegation of a proﬁt-sale incentive. In the case of strategic complements, the
delegated incentives work to increase the owner’s expected proﬁts. Miller and Pazgal
(2001, 2005) illustrate the equivalence of price and quantity competitions by a relative
performance measure in which managers are rewarded based on a weighted sum of
3the ﬁrm’s own proﬁt and its rival’s proﬁt. However, information about the speciﬁcs
of a rival’s proﬁt is diﬃcult to attain and such formal incentives are not observed in
practice. Moreover, as Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Spagnolo (2005) are correct
to point out, use of the relative performance delegation provides an incentive to col-
lude and would therefore come under the scrutiny of competition agencies. In our
model, optimal delegation contracts, relative to the benchmark Cournot equilibrium,
mitigates competition and demonstrates that the disparity of equilibrium outcomes in
quantity and price competitions is smaller with delegation than without delegation.
Furthermore, we show that the aforementioned prisoner’s dilemma is functionally im-
practical because shareholders would have to reward managers for lowering the value
of the stock. The model implicitly recognizes that investors manage diversiﬁable risk
and is therefore agnostic about the supergame incentives brought forth in Spagnolo
(1999, 2000, 2005). Because a ﬁrm’s nondiversiﬁable risk proﬁle can be altered by
changing the boundary of the ﬁrm, this paper sheds new light on incentives for vertical
contracts, new product development, and both vertical and horizontal mergers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines a model
of a two-stage game in which the shareholders decide a combined objective of ﬁrm’s
anticipated proﬁt and CAPM-styled value of equity for their managers in the ﬁrst
period, and managers compete in either quantity or price in the second period. We
compare quantity-setting and price-setting equilibrium outcomes in three diﬀerent
scenarios, including general MVM, typical MVM, and proﬁt maximization objectives.
Concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are oﬀered in section 3.
42 The Model
A model built on the concept of asset value maximization necessarily involves a frame-
work for dealing with uncertainty. We assume a ﬁnancial market characterized by
the single-period Sharpe-Lintner equilibrium. That is,
E(˜ ri) = r + βi [E(˜ rm) − r], (1)
where r is the risk-free interest rate, E(˜ ri) and E(˜ rm) are expected rates of return of
asset i and market portfolio, respectively, while βi is systematic risk or market risk
deﬁned by Cov(˜ ri, ˜ rm)/V ar(˜ rm). The ﬁrm i’s market value can be obtained by Vi =
e πi/(1 + ˜ ri), where e πi is the stochastic cash ﬂow of net earnings.
The objective function of MVM ﬁrm can be easily derived. Because e πi = (1+˜ ri)Vi,
E(e πi)
Vi
= 1 + E(˜ ri) = 1 + r +
Cov(˜ ri, ˜ rm)
V ar(˜ rm)
[E(˜ rm) − r]
= 1 + r +
·
E(˜ rm) − r
V ar(˜ rm)
¸
Cov(e πi, ˜ rm)
Vi
. (2)
Rearranging (2) yields ﬁrm i’s “market value”objective function:
Vi =
1
1 + r
[E(e πi) − λCov(e πi,e rm)], (3)
where λ is the equilibrium shadow price of market risk, deﬁned by [E(e rm) − r]/σ2
m
and σ2
m = V ar(˜ rm).
The model in this study is essentially a two-stage sequential duopoly game. In the
ﬁrst stage, the owners (shareholders) of each ﬁrm delegate the product market decision
to managers by properly arranging a linear combination of the ﬁrm’s anticipated
proﬁt and the CAPM-styled value of equity. In the second stage, the manager of each
ﬁrm decides the quantity to produce or the price to charge in the product market.
Following the framework in Vickers (1985) and FJS the objective function facing
5manager i is given by
Mi = (1 − θi)EΠi + θiVi, (4)
where θi is an incentive parameter chosen by shareholders in ﬁrm i, EΠi = E(e πi)/(1+
r), and Vi is deﬁned in (3).2 By rearranging (4), we have
Mi =
1
1 + r
[E(e πi) − θiλCov(e πi,e rm)]. (5)
Note that if shareholders delegate the incentive: θi = 1, we arrive back to equation
(3), which implies a full incorporation of a CAPM-styled ﬁnancial objective. It turns
out that equation (1) facing the manager in the general MVM framework can be
rewritten as
E(˜ ri) = r + θiβi [E(˜ rm) − r], (6)
where θi may be interpreted as to how the market risk is perceived by shareholders in
ﬁrm i relative to the standard CAPM benchmark that θi = 1. Practically speaking,
equations (4) and (5) show that managers can receive the desired shareholder incentive
using a simple combination of proﬁt-sharing bonuses and managerial stock holdings
held in escrow.
Assume that each ﬁrm faces uncertain demand and that the same constant mar-
ginal cost (c) is known with certainty. Both ﬁrms’ revenues are subject to a random
shock that neither can observe when the strategic variables are chosen. As a result,
ﬁrm i’s total revenue is given by
˜ Ri = piXi(1 + ˜ e),E(˜ e) = 0,V ar(˜ e) = σ
2
e, (7)
where pi is the price, Xi is the quantity produced, and the random variable ˜ e is an
idiosyncratic shock on the revenue of ﬁrm i. Without loss of generality, it is assumed
2In general, the manager’s objective function should be A+B×Mi, where A and B are constant
and B > 0. Both A and B are irrelevant to the product market decisions.
6to have mean of zero. σe is the standard deviation of the shock.3 It is further assumed
for every demand curve that the support of the noise is small enough so that negative
revenue never occurs. Thus, the expected net earnings are
E(e πi) = E [piXi(1 + ˜ e)] − Xic = piXi − Xic.
Moreover, because Cov(e πi, ˜ rm) = Cov(˜ e, ˜ rm)piXi,
Vi =
piXi(1 − λCov(˜ e, ˜ rm)) − Xic
1 + r
=
φpiXi − Xic
1 + r
=
φXi(pi − d)
1 + r
, (8)
where certainty equivalent φ = 1−λCov(˜ e, ˜ rm) = 1−λρσeσm and ρ is the correlation
coeﬃcient between the revenue shock and the return on a market portfolio. In general,
φ ∈ [0,1] and d = c/φ is adjusted marginal cost, provided that φ  = 0.4
By a parallel logic, the manager’s objective becomes:
Mi =
piXi(1 − θiλCov(˜ e, ˜ rm)) − Xic
1 + r
=
φiXi(pi − di)
1 + r
, (9)
where φi = 1−θiλρσeσm and di = c/φi. To simplify the analysis and rule out possible
counter-intuitive results, we focus positive ρ and assume that θi < 1/(λρσeσm) and
λρσeσm  = 0.
Suppose further that each ﬁrm faces a linear inverse product market demand
function5 given by:
pi = α − bXi − γXj, b ≥ γ ≥ 0, i,j = 1,2, i  = j. (10)
b ≥ γ implies that the own eﬀect (b) is at least as large as the cross eﬀect (γ) and
γ ≥ 0 presumes the case of substitutes. In addition, we assume α > d. We also
3The shareholders perceive risk derived from ˜ e to be revenue variation outside of managerial
control and also nondiversiﬁable.
4Our results easily generalize to include independent cost uncertainty in equation (8). By deﬁning
ψ as a certainty equivalent parameter on the cost side, for a strictly convex cost function, ψ > 1,
and d = cψ/φ implying that d > c.
5See also Dixit (1979), Singh and Vives (1984), and Vives (1999).
7deﬁne δ = γ/b to model the degree of (horizontal) product diﬀerentiation.6 The more
diﬀerentiated the products (δ ↓), the smaller the eﬀect of a change in quantity (price)
of brand j on the price (quantity) of brand i. Note that by assumption 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Therefore, (10) can be rewritten as
pi = α − b(Xi + δXj), 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, i,j = 1,2, i  = j. (11)
Lemma 1 provides a useful way to determine the range of θ.
Lemma 1. (a) di R d ⇐⇒ θi R 1 and (b) di R c ⇐⇒ θi R 0.
Proof. By deﬁnition, di = d ⇐⇒ θi = 1 and di = c ⇐⇒ θi = 0. By assumptions
θi < 1/(λρσeσm) and φ = 1 − λρσeσm  = 0, with monotonicity that
∂di
∂θi
=
∂
∂θi
c
1 − θiλρσeσm
=
λρσeσmc
(1 − θiλρσeσm)
2 > 0,
lemma 1 is proved.
By the one-to-one mapping for θi and di, Lemma 1 allows us to focus on the
adjusted marginal cost di. We may easily characterize the properties of incentive
parameter θi via a simple transformation from di.
The product markets are evaluated under both price and quantity competition.
The two-stage game is solved via backward induction.
Quantity Competition
Under quantity competition, managers in both ﬁrms choose quantity strategies si-
multaneously, taking each other’s strategy as a given. In the second period, manager
i faces the objective function
Mi =
φi
1 + r
Xi(pi − di) =
φi
1 + r
Xi [α − b(Xi + δXj) − di]. (12)
6Note that the deﬁnition here diﬀers from the common setting seen in, for example, Shy (1995).
8Taking a derivative with respect to Xi and rearranging yield
2Xi + δXj =
α − di
b
. (13)
Equation (13) implicitly deﬁnes manager i’s reaction function. Impacts of an in-
crease in di under quantity competition are depicted in Figure 1(a). As we can see,
MVM delegation strategies mitigate competition relative to the traditional Cournot
benchmark. Similarly, we can get manager j’s reaction function. Solving for optimal
quantity and price yields
X
c
i =
α(2 − δ) − 2di + δdj
b(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
, p
c
i =
α(2 − δ) + (2 − δ
2)di + δdj
(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
. (14)
Therefore, the value of the ﬁrm facing the shareholders in quantity competition be-
comes
V
c
i =
φXc
i(pc
i − d)
1 + r
(15)
=
φ
1 + r
·
α(2 − δ) − 2di + δdj
b(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
¸·
α(2 − δ) + (2 − δ
2)di + δdj
(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
− d
¸
.
The reaction function7 for shareholders in ﬁrm i is
4(2 − δ
2)di + δ
3dj = (2 − δ)
£
2(2 + δ)d − αδ
2¤
. (16)
We may write equilibrium di in quantity competition as
d
c =
2(2 + δ)d − αδ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2 = d −
(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2. (17)
Therefore, equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value in quantity competition can be
given by
X
c =
2(α − d)
b(4 + 2δ − δ
2)
, p
c =
(2 − δ
2)α + 2(1 + δ)d
4 + 2δ − δ
2 ,
V
c =
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
2(2 − δ
2)
(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2.
7The choice variable should be θi. However, as proved in lemma 1, di is increasing monotonically
in θi as long as θi  = 1/(λρσeσm).
9We are interested in the range of θ in quantity competition. As a result, proposi-
tion 1 follows.
Proposition 1. (a) θ
c ≤ 1.
(b) θ
c ≥ 0 if
c ≥
αφδ
2
2(2 + δ)(1 − φ) + φδ
2 ≡ c. (18)
Proof. (a) By subtracting d from dc, we get
d
c − d =
−(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2 ≤ 0,
because α > d and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Since dc ≤ d, by lemma 1(a), θ
c ≤ 1.
(b) To obtain θ
c ≥ 0, we need to show dc ≥ c by lemma 1(b). Thus,
d
c − c = d
c − d + (1 − φ)d =
−(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2 + (1 − φ)d
=
1
4 + 2δ − δ
2
·
−δ
2α +
2(2 + δ)(1 − φ) + φδ
2
φ
c
¸
≥ 0, by condition in (18).
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the incentive parameter depends in part on the
marginal cost-demand intercept ratio (c/α). By proposition 1(b), the minimal cost c
for θ
c ≥ 0 depends, ceteris paribus, on the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Figure 2
presents the relationships found in proposition 1(b). The curved line through Figure
2 represents the loci of points between δ and c/α such that c/α = c/α and θ
c = 0.
The numerical assumptions about the price of risk follow examples presented in Dixit
and Pindyck (1994) and φ = 0.96.8 Note that in the lower right half of Figure 2
8Dixit and Pindyck (1994) use the New York Stock Exchange Index as the market and get
E(˜ rm) − r ≈ 0.08 and σm ≈ 0.2, so λ = [E(e rm) − r]/σ2
m ≈ 2. We produce Figure 2 by assuming
λ = 2, σm = 0.2, σe = 0.2, and ρ = 0.5.
10shareholders optimally set θ
c to punish managers for increasing the ﬁrm value: a
condition suggestive of mangers holding a short position in the ﬁrm’s stock. Returning
to equation (9), we can see that θ
c < 0 signals the manager to become more aggressive
in maximizing revenues. Of course, the impact of being more aggressive in a market
with strategic substitutes is at the heart of the prisoner’s dilemma common to the
strategic delegation literature. While such an outcome is feasible in our model, it
seems to be highly impractical (i.e. θ
c should be nonnegative). Indeed, because
shareholders would not sign oﬀ on the unilateral incentive package that rewards a
manager for lowering the stock price, they can essentially avoid the prisoner’s dilemma
outcome. Additionally, we ﬁnd in our model many instances when θ
c is optimally
positive, which signals a less aggressive stance in the product market. As shown
in Figure 2, the more diﬀerentiated the product (δ ↓), the less minimal cost (c ↓)
required; i.e., ∂c/∂δ ≥ 0 for positive θ
c. We will assume that (18) holds throughout
the paper and therefore 0 ≤ θ
c ≤ 1.
Impacts of degree of product diﬀerentiation on optimal delegation are examined
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. ∂θ
c/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂dc/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂Xc/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂pc/∂δ ≤ 0, and ∂V c/∂δ ≤ 0.
Proof. By ∂di/∂θi > 0, for ∂θ
c/∂δ ≤ 0, we only need to show ∂dc/∂δ ≤ 0. Thus,
∂dc
∂δ
=
−2(α − d)(4 + δ)δ
(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2 ≤ 0,
∂Xc
∂δ
=
−4(α − d)(1 − δ)
b(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2 ≤ 0,
∂pc
∂δ
=
−2(α − d)(2 + 2δ + δ
2)
(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2 ≤ 0,
∂V c
∂δ
=
−4φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
(4 + δ
3)
(4 + 2δ − δ
2)3 ≤ 0.
11By rewriting (11), pi = α − b(Xi + δXj) = (α − bδXj) − bXi. It implies that
as the product becomes more diﬀerentiated (δ ↓), the residual demand facing ﬁrm
i increases, which leads to more emphasis on MVM objective, more output, higher
price, and higher ﬁrm value. Proposition 2 is straightforward because the product
market is less competitive when the product is more diﬀerentiated.
Let us deﬁne equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value under stylized equilibrium
market value maximization (θ = 1) and proﬁt maximization (θ = 0) to be Xc
m,pc
m,V c
m
and Xc
p,pc
p,V c
p , respectively. We have
X
c
m =
α − d
b(2 + δ)
, p
c
m =
α + (1 + δ)d
2 + δ
,V
c
m =
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
1
(2 + δ)2; (19)
X
c
p =
α − c
b(2 + δ)
, p
c
p =
α + (1 + δ)c
2 + δ
, (20)
V
c
p =
(α − c)
b(1 + r)
{φα − [(2 − φ) + (1 − φ)δ]c}
(2 + δ)2 .
Now, by holding the diﬀerentiation parameter constant, comparing equilibrium quan-
tity, price, and ﬁrm value in three diﬀerent scenarios leads to proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that (18) holds, Xc
m ≤ Xc ≤ Xc
p, pc
m ≥ pc ≥ pc
p, and
V c
m ≥ V c ≥ V c
p .
Proof. Let us deﬁne equilibrium outcomes in quantity competition as
X
c
e = X
c
e(d
c
e) =
α − dc
e
b(2 + δ)
, p
c
e = p
c
e(d
c
e) =
α + (1 + δ)dc
e
2 + δ
,
V
c
e = V
c
e (d
c
e) =
φ
1 + r
α − dc
e
b(2 + δ)
·
α + (1 + δ)dc
e
2 + δ
− d
¸
,
where dc
e = dc,d, and c for θ = θ
c,1, and 0, respectively. For quantity and price, it
is easy to see ∂Xc
e/∂dc
e < 0 and ∂pc
e/∂dc
e > 0. By proposition 1, we have d ≥ dc ≥ c.
Therefore, Xc
m ≤ Xc ≤ Xc
p and pc
m ≥ pc ≥ pc
p. For ﬁrm value,
∂V c
e
∂dc
e
=
φ[δ(α − d) − 2(1 + δ)(dc
e − d)]
b(1 + r)(2 + δ)2 .
12Thus,
∂V c
e
∂dc
e
> 0, for d
c
e ≤ d +
δ(α − d)
2(1 + δ)
≡ d
c
e.
Because d ≥ dc ≥ c, we have d
c
e ≥ d ≥ dc ≥ c. This completes the proof.
Proposition 3 shows that when shareholders maximize ﬁrm’s market values, op-
timal delegation mitigates product market competition in a quantity-setting game
compared with the results obtained from the stylized proﬁt maximization objective;
that is, Xc ≤ Xc
p, pc ≥ pc
p, and V c ≥ V c
p . Another interesting feature of the model
emerges in the comparison of stylized MVM (θ = 1) with optimal delegation (θ = θ
c).
Here, optimal delegation leads to a more competitive outcome. The story here paral-
lels that of Fershtman and Judd (1987) (and also Eaton and Grossman, 1986), which
we discuss in the concluding comments of this section.
Price Competition
Turning now to competition in price space, the corresponding demand function is
Xi =
1
b(1 − δ
2)
[α(1 − δ) − pi + δpj]. (21)
In the second period, manager i maximizes the objective function
Mi =
φi
1 + r
Xi(pi − di) =
φi
1 + r
1
b(1 − δ
2)
[α(1 − δ) − pi + δpj](pi − di). (22)
As a result, manager i’s reaction function in price competition is
2pi − δpj = α(1 − δ) + di. (23)
Impacts of an increase in di on reaction functions are depicted in Figure 1(b). Solving
for optimal price and quantity yields
p
b
i =
α(1 − δ)(2 + δ) + 2di + δdj
(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
, X
b
i =
α(1 − δ)(2 + δ) − (2 − δ
2)di + δdj
b(1 − δ
2)(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
. (24)
13In the ﬁrst period, the shareholders’ objective function is
V
b
i =
φXb
i(pb
i − d)
1 + r
(25)
=
φ
1 + r
·
α(1 − δ)(2 + δ) − (2 − δ
2)di + δdj
b(1 − δ
2)(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
¸·
α(1 − δ)(2 + δ) + 2di + δdj
(2 + δ)(2 − δ)
− d
¸
.
The reaction function for shareholders in ﬁrm i is
4(2 − δ
2)di − δ
3dj = α(1 − δ)(2 + δ)δ
2 + (2 − δ
2)(4 − δ
2)d. (26)
We may write equilibrium di in price competition as
d
b =
α(1 − δ)δ
2 + (2 − δ
2)(2 − δ)d
4 − 2δ − δ
2 = d +
(α − d)(1 − δ)δ
2
4 − 2δ − δ
2 . (27)
Therefore, equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value in price competition are given
by
X
b =
(2 − δ
2)(α − d)
b(1 + δ)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)
, p
b =
2(1 − δ)α + (2 − δ
2)d
4 − 2δ − δ
2 ,
V
b =
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
2(1 − δ)(2 − δ
2)
(1 + δ)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)2.
From (27) we have proposition 4.
Proposition 4. θ
b ≥ 1.
Proof. By (27) and assumptions that α > d and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, we have
d
b − d =
(α − d)(1 − δ)δ
2
4 − 2δ − δ
2 ≥ 0.
Together with lemma 1(a), θ
b ≥ 1.
Under price competition, those managers pursuing proﬁt maximization are pe-
nalized (1 − θ
b ≤ 0). The overcompensation for ﬁrm’s market value (θ
b ≥ 1) can be
interpreted as shareholders imposing a tax on the manager that forces a consideration
14of nondiversiﬁable risk in product market decisions. From (6) and proposition 4, the
tax mitigates competition and assures the ﬁrm that it will earn CAPM-styled ﬁrm
values or higher.
Similar to proposition 2, we have proposition 5.
Proposition 5. ∂pb/∂δ ≤ 0 and ∂V b/∂δ ≤ 0.
Proof.
∂pb
∂δ
=
−2(α − d)[1 + (1 − δ)2]
¡
4 − 2δ − δ
2¢2 ≤ 0,
∂V b
∂δ
= −
4φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
©
(1 − δ)[3 + (1 − δ
2)2] + δ
3ª
(1 + δ)2 ¡
4 − 2δ − δ
2¢3 ≤ 0.
Proposition 5 shows that the product market is less competitive when the prod-
uct is more diﬀerentiated: price and ﬁrm value are strictly increasing as δ declines.
Unlike the quantity game case that ∂Xc/∂δ ≤ 0, we get negative ∂Xb/∂δ with small
δ, but positive ∂Xb/∂δ with large δ.9 As we move across the spectrum from homo-
geneous products to complete diﬀerentiation, this implies that managers will initially
look to cut output in response to a higher level of diﬀerentiation (i.e. when δ is
large). When products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, managers will react to greater
diﬀerentiation by increasing output and raising price. Under product homogeneity,
strategic delegation assures the ﬁrm that it will avoid the Bertrand paradox and pro-
vide CAPM-prescribed returns to shareholders. The model thus describes a condition
in which a zero Lerner index is not the appropriate benchmark for competition agen-
cies and that some economic proﬁt is attributable to simply a return to the ﬁrm for
operating with systematic risk. While we have no conclusion on ∂db/∂δ (or ∂θ
b/∂δ),
9This U-shaped relationship of Xb and δ can be seen by examining ﬁrm i’s residual demand in
equation (21) as well.
15the diﬀerence (db − d or θ
b − 1), which can be interpreted as shareholders’ strategic
motives, varying with δ has some interesting implications. We will investigate more
on this feature under quantity and price competitions in proposition 7.
Let us deﬁne equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value under stylized equilibrium
market value maximization (θ = 1) and proﬁt maximization (θ = 0) to be Xb
m,pb
m,V b
m
and Xb
p,pb
p,V b
p , respectively, under price competition. We have
X
b
m =
α − d
b(1 + δ)(2 − δ)
,p
b
m =
α(1 − δ) + d
2 − δ
,V
b
m =
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
1 − δ
(1 + δ)(2 − δ)2;(28)
X
b
p =
α − c
b(1 + δ)(2 − δ)
,p
b
p =
α(1 − δ) + c
2 − δ
, (29)
V
b
p =
(α − c)
b(1 + r)
[φ(1 − δ)α − (2 − φ − δ)c]
(1 + δ)(2 − δ)2 .
By comparing equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value in three diﬀerent scenarios,
we have proposition 6.
Proposition 6. Xb ≤ Xb
m ≤ Xb
p, pb ≥ pb
m ≥ pb
p, and V b ≥ V b
m ≥ V b
p .
Proof. Let us deﬁne equilibrium outcomes in price competition as
X
b
e = X
b
e(d
b
e) =
α − db
e
b(1 + δ)(2 − δ)
, p
b
e = p
b
e(d
b
e) =
α(1 − δ) + db
e
2 − δ
,
V
b
e = V
b
e (d
b
e) =
φ
1 + r
α − db
e
b(1 + δ)(2 − δ)
·
α(1 − δ) + db
e
2 − δ
− d
¸
,
where db
e = db,d, and c for θ = θ
b,1, and 0, respectively. For quantity and price, it is
easy to see ∂Xb
e/∂db
e < 0 and ∂pb
e/∂db
e > 0. Thus, from proposition 4 and d ≥ c, we
have Xb ≤ Xb
m ≤ Xb
p and pb ≥ pb
m ≥ pb
p. For ﬁrm value,
∂V b
e
∂db
e
=
φ
£
δ(α − d) − 2(db
e − d)
¤
b(1 + r)(1 + δ)(2 − δ)2 .
Therefore,
∂V b
e
∂db
e
> 0, for d
b
e ≤ d +
δ(α − d)
2
≡ d
b
e.
16Because db ≥ d ≥ c, all we need to show is d
b
e ≥ db.
d
b
e − d
b =
δ(α − d)(2 − δ)2
2(4 − 2δ − δ
2)
≥ 0.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 6 shows the results similar to those found in quantity competition:
when shareholders maximize ﬁrm’s market values, optimal delegation mitigates prod-
uct market competition in a price-setting game compared with the results obtained
from the stylized proﬁt maximization objective; that is, Xb ≤ Xb
p, pb ≥ pb
p, and
V b ≥ V b
p . Optimal delegation mitigates competition even more than stylized MVM
(θ = 1). The shareholders achieve even higher ﬁrm value (V b ≥ V b
m) by delegat-
ing product market decision to managers and the delegation gain for shareholders
is (V b − V b
m) because the choice variable, price in the product market is a strategic
complement. See Figure 1(b) for more details.
Comparison of Quantity and Price Competitions
In this section we compare strategic motives of shareholders and equilibrium outcomes
under quantity and price competitions. In the discussion of proposition 5, we mention
that (db − d) can represent shareholders’ strategic motives and this implication can
be extended to the case of quantity competition. If there exist no strategic concerns,
intuitively, the MVM shareholders will select adjusted marginal cost d by setting
θ = 1 for either quantity or price competition. By subtracting d from dc or db, we
can measure the intensity of shareholders’ strategic motives to manipulate managers’
product market decisions. Proposition 7 examines how shareholders’ strategic motives
vary with the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Proposition 7. Shareholders have no strategic motives when (1) δ = 0 (monopoly,
quantity and price competitions coincide), and (2) δ = 1 (standard Bertrand com-
17petition). However, shareholders have the strongest strategic motives when δ = 1
(standard Cournot competition).
Proof. From (17) and (27), we have
∆
c(δ) ≡ d
c − d =
−(α − d)δ
2
4 + 2δ − δ
2,
∂∆c
∂δ
= −
2δ(4 + δ)(α − d)
¡
4 + 2δ − δ
2¢2 ; (30)
∆
b(δ) ≡ d
b − d =
(α − d)(1 − δ)δ
2
4 − 2δ − δ
2 ,
∂∆b
∂δ
=
δ(8 − 14δ + 4δ
2 + δ
3)(α − d)
¡
4 − 2δ − δ
2¢2 .(31)
For δ ∈ [0,1], ∆c is monotonically decreasing in δ and ∆c(0) = 0 and ∆c(1) = −(α−
d)/5 from (30). From (31), ∆b(0) = ∆b(1) = 0. Note that ∆c(0) = ∆b(0) = ∆b(1) = 0
for cases of no strategic motives as dc = d and db = d. Moreover, we know that ∆b
and ∂∆b/∂δ are continuous and diﬀerentiable in domain [0,1], ∂∆b(0+)/∂δ > 0 and
∂∆b(1)/∂δ < 0. Thus, there exists at least one maximum. Though it is available for
an analytical solution to max
δ
∆b(δ), ∀δ ∈ [0,1], we only present it numerically for
illustrative purposes. The maximal ∆b is 0.0731(α − d) when δ = 0.778, which can
be referred to Figure 3. It turns out that |∆c(1)| > |∆b(0.778)|.
The graphs of ∆c(δ) and ∆b(δ) are depicted in Figure 3. When δ = 0, the
product markets are separate, each ﬁrm is a monopolist in its own market, and
quantity and price decisions coincide. In this case, shareholders have no incentives to
act strategically and managers are instructed to maximize the ﬁrm’s capital market
value. An interesting case emerges that when products are homogeneous (δ = 1):
shareholders have opposite strategies under quantity and price competitions. For
the case of homogeneous products, we arrive at standard Cournot and Bertrand
competitions. The rationale for such an outcome is straightforward. Under price
competition and product homogeneity, the traditional Bertrand paradox suggests
each ﬁrm will undercut its competitor by some small price change until price equals
marginal cost. This undercutting pattern stops in the MVM model at the adjusted
18marginal cost (d), the equilibrium value of the ﬁrm is zero and shareholders have no
incentive to be strategic in writing the incentive contract. The Lerner index of market
power is (d−c)/d = (c−φc)/c = 1−φ, which is positive in the presence of systematic
risk and shareholders are paid a CAPM return on their invested capital based on their
risk proﬁle. Thus, in the strictest sense of the deﬁnition of “zero economic proﬁts,”
it does not exist in our model. Antitrust challenges to mergers should recognize
systematic risk in simulation models. In quantity competition, strategic motives
become the most important when products are homogeneous as shown in proposition
7.
We further compare the equilibrium outcomes under diﬀerent modes of com-
petition. By looking at propositions 3 and 6, we have no conclusion on compar-
isons of equilibrium outcomes between proﬁt-maximizing quantity competition (i.e.,
Xc
p,pc
p,V c
p ) and general MVM price competition (i.e., Xb,pb,V b) because they depend
on the certainty equivalent measure φ. For a large φ, it is more competitive in the
general MVM price game and more likely to get Xc
p ≤ Xb, pc
p ≥ pb, and V c
p ≥ V b.
In what follows, instead, we are interested in the comparison of delegation equilibria
under quantity and price competitions.
Proposition 8. Xc ≤ Xb, pc ≥ pb, and V c ≥ V b.
Proof. We directly compute the corresponding diﬀerences:
X
c − X
b =
2(α − d)
b(4 + 2δ − δ
2)
−
(2 − δ
2)(α − d)
b(1 + δ)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)
(32)
=
−δ
4(α − d)
b(1 + δ)(4 + 2δ − δ
2)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)
≤ 0,
p
c − p
b =
(2 − δ
2)α + 2(1 + δ)d
4 + 2δ − δ
2 −
2(1 − δ)α + (2 − δ
2)d
4 − 2δ − δ
2 (33)
=
δ
4(α − d)
(4 + 2δ − δ
2)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)
≥ 0,
19V
c − V
b =
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
2(2 − δ
2)
(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2 −
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
2(1 − δ)(2 − δ
2)
(1 + δ)(4 − 2δ − δ
2)2 (34)
=
φ(α − d)2
b(1 + r)
4(2 − δ
2)δ
5
(1 + δ)(4 + 2δ − δ
2)2(4 − 2δ − δ
2)2 ≥ 0.
(32)-(34) complete the proof.
Proposition 8 shows that the delegation price competition is more competitive
than the delegation quantity competition, though the former is less competitive than
the stylized MVM game from proposition 6. Together propositions 3 and 6 with 8,
we have Xc
m ≤ Xc ≤ Xb ≤ Xb
m, pc
m ≥ pc ≥ pb ≥ pb
m, and V c
m ≥ V c ≥ V b ≥ V b
m.
The diﬀerences of equilibria between quantity and price competitions are smaller
under optimal delegation. From proposition 8, we also notice that the diﬀerences
decrease rapidly when the products are more diﬀerentiated and these diﬀerences are
not important if the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
In Fershtman and Judd (1987), the shareholders’ objective is to maximize prof-
its leading to a delegation strategy of a linear combination of proﬁts and revenues.
The result is that under quantity competition the ﬁrm is actually worse oﬀ relative
the standard Cournot outcome, while it is better oﬀ under price competition. Their
ﬁnding raised the critique about the sensitivity of these models to the mode of con-
duct. However, in the current MVM framework, where managers maximize a linear
combination of ﬁrm values and expected proﬁts, the ﬁrm is better oﬀ under both
quantity and price competitions relative to the results with the proﬁt maximization
objective. We further show that the diﬀerences of delegation equilibrium outcomes
under diﬀerent modes of competition are very small when the products become more
diﬀerentiated. The results suggest that mode of competition issues remain important
but are less pressing than commonly believed.
203 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a model of equity value maximization that allows share-
holders to manipulate the manager’s incentives by strategically arranging a manager’s
objective scheme in a duopoly framework. In a two-stage setting, the shareholders
delegate to the manager in the ﬁrst stage to maximize a speciﬁc linear combination
of anticipated proﬁts and CAPM-styled ﬁrm values. Managers subsequently compete
in either quantity or price in the second stage. This study sheds light on several im-
portant areas of interest to industrial organization economists, business and ﬁnance
strategists, and government policymakers. Because shareholders are free to diversify
their portfolios, our analysis isolates on nondiversiﬁable risk to show how shareholders
optimally provide incentives to managers to consider such risk in product market de-
cisions. Our ﬁndings lay the groundwork for a new approach to analyzing oligopolistic
behavior.
According to equation (6), the incentive parameter, θ, represents how nondiversiﬁ-
able risk is perceived by shareholders relative to the standard CAPM framework. For
both quantity and price games, nonnegative θ leads to less aggressive product market
competition and θ = 1 infers the case of no strategic opportunity and shareholders
signal managers to maximize the ﬁrm’s capital value. Optimal delegation contracts
for quantity games are 0 ≤ θ
c ≤ 1. Although θ
c < 0 represents a possible optimal
delegation, it is functionally impractical to presume the ﬁrm would reward a man-
ager for lowering the ﬁrm value. This represents a key feature of our model because
choosing θ
c < 0 is the only way that the traditional prisoner’s dilemma in quantity
delegation models can emerge. Depending on the interaction of demand conditions
and nondiversiﬁable risk, we could observe equilibrium outcomes that support sole
proﬁt maximizing behavior by the ﬁrm, i.e., θ
c = 0. However, this is an industry-
21dependent outcome and a subject of future empirical work. In price setting games,
optimal incentives are chosen where θ
b ≥ 1. Thus, sole proﬁt maximization will never
occur and, as in other delegation studies, we ﬁnd the ﬁrm in an advantageous position
to increase value (and proﬁt) when competing in a market of strategic complements.
The impacts of the degree of product diﬀerentiation on optimal delegation are ex-
amined. In general, the product market is less competitive when the product is more
diﬀerentiated and, eventually, increased product diﬀerentiation leads to monopoly
and the elimination of a strategic incentive (i.e. θ = 1 in both price and quan-
tity competitions). As the product market become less diﬀerentiated, shareholders
under quantity competition have an increasingly stronger incentive to delegate to-
ward a greater emphasis on proﬁts and less on ﬁrm value. Under price competition,
there exists a complex interaction between changes in product diﬀerentiation and the
incentive parameter. In equilibrium, price is monotonically decreasing as the prod-
uct market becomes more homogeneous. However, the strategic incentive parameter
peaks before products become perfect substitutes and managers begin to receive in-
centive packages toward CAPM-styled ﬁrm values after the peak. Finally, the model
eﬀectively eliminates the Bertrand paradox. Under perfect substitutes, ﬁrm value
drops to zero and the ﬁrm earns nonnegative proﬁts that only compensate investors
for nondiversiﬁable risk. The model suggests that the benchmark Lerner index for
competition authorities should account for this adjustment.
We compared equilibrium quantity, price, and ﬁrm value in three diﬀerent sce-
narios, including MVM delegation, stylized CAPM (θ = 1), and proﬁt maximization
(θ = 0) for both quantity and price games. The results indicate that strategic delega-
tion of the MVM objective mitigates competition in both price and quantity games
compared with the results obtained from the typical proﬁt maximization objective.
By manipulating the incentive parameter and allowing managers to consider market
22risk in product market decisions, the optimal delegation leads to greater market coor-
dination, higher proﬁts, and higher stock values. In addition, we demonstrate that the
disparity of equilibrium outcomes in quantity and price games is smaller with delega-
tion than without delegation. As products become more diﬀerentiated, the mentioned
diﬀerence becomes very small. The results suggest that mode of competition issues
remain important but are less pressing than commonly believed.
There are signiﬁcant and interesting extensions of this research. First, the model
brings forth several empirically testable hypotheses. One hypothesis could involve
testing if θ = 0, using applied demand models under imperfect competition. Verifying
whether or not product markets are impacted by the presence of nondiversiﬁable
risk would be an important step in determining the importance of capital market-
based managerial incentives. In the context of cross-industry analysis, the model
suggest that managers in industries playing price games are more likely to receive
larger incentives based on maximizing ﬁrm value relative to the incentive packages
for managers in predominant quantity setting industries. This could be testable
using standard data sources such as Compustat. The concept of nondiversiﬁable
risk presumes the boundary of the ﬁrm remains ﬁxed through time. In reality, ﬁrms
regularly contract or expand the ﬁrm’s boundaries through new product development,
R&D, input and output market contracts, and, of course, mergers and spinoﬀs. These
events have the potential to alter the covariance of the ﬁrms earnings to the capital
market, which changes the optimal incentive contract. As well, in an evolutionary
process, shareholders may set incentive contracts to encourage a more (or less) activist
role in the manager’s shaping of the ﬁrm boundaries. These are areas for future
theoretical development.
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Figure 1: Eﬀects of an Increase in θ0.00
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Figure 2:  Marginal Cost-Demand Intercept Ratio (c/α) vs. Degree of Product 
   Differentiation (δ) under Quantity Competition [φ = 0.96] 
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   Figure 3:  Strategic Motives of Shareholders under Quantity and Price Competitions 
          [α - d = 1] 
δ 
c/α 
θ > 0 
θ < 0 
δ  
d d
b b − = ∆  
d d
c c − = ∆  